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Abstract 
In 2008 the landmark decision in A v Hoare1 was received from the House of Lords. 
The decision will have a wide impact on the law on limitation periods in claims for 
personal injury. Victims of intentional trespass to the person can now apply to the 
court to either extend or disapply the primary limitation period. This article will 
consider the wider implications of the decision on issues of limitation. It aims to 
examine what the initial rationale of limitation legislation is. With this in consideration 
the article then analyses judicial application of the Limitation Act 1980 prior to, and 
post A v Hoare. This enables the article to conclude on whether the initial purpose of 
having limitation periods in personal injury claims is currently being met.  
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Introduction 
Placing limits on the amount of time in which a claimant has to institute proceedings 
against his tortfeasor is a concept widely accepted and firmly recognised by law. The 
consequence of failing to make a claim within the limitation period is procedural only. 
It bars the claimant’s ability to take an action to receive a remedy for his injury. Under 
the current law a claimant has three years from the date of accrual, or the date of 
knowledge, to bring a claim for personal injury. However, in practice defining when 
the limitation period should start to run under section 14 Limitation Act 1980 (LA 
1980), and in what circumstances the discretion should be exercised under section 
33, has proved a difficult task to achieve.  
 
In 2001 the Law Commission (LC) published a Report on Limitation of Actions,2 
which reviewed the entire topic of limitation law and provided strong 
recommendations for reform. The view of the LC in this report is that the law on 
limitation of actions in personal injury is ‘unfair, complex, uncertain and outdated.’3 
                                                 
1
 [2008] UKHL 6. 
2
 Law Commission, Report on Limitation of Actions, (2001, LC No 270). 
3
 Ibid para.1.4. 
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The LC recommended that a new ‘core regime’ should be applied to limitation 
periods in order to overcome these problems and that ‘a simpler and more uniform 
scheme’4 needed to be established in relation to the application of the LA 1980.  Most 
notably the LC put forward their recommendations in relation to claims for injuries 
arising as a result of intentional trespass to the person. The LC argued that these 
claims, which fall under s.2 of the 1980 Act and are subject to a limitation period of 
six years, should fall within the same provisions as the three-year period relating to 
all other types of personal injury5 under s.11 of the Act. 
 
This article discusses the history of limitation law to establish the initial purpose of 
limitation periods in personal injury claims. It then examines judicial application of 
sections 14 and 33 of the LA 1980, both of which threaten the initial purpose of the 
legislation. The article finally examines the decision in A v Hoare, which brings the 
law in line with the recommendations made by the LC in relation to victims of 
intentional trespass to the person. This enables a conclusion to be reached on the 
effectiveness of limitation law in relation to its initial purpose.   
 
1 The Initial Purpose of Limitation Laws in Claims for Personal 
Injury 
The law in relation to limitation periods in personal injury claims has seen significant 
development over the centuries culminating in the LA 1980. Over time, important new 
provisions have been introduced which have meant that it is possible to divert from 
the primary limitation period. The legislation dates back to the Limitation Act 1623 
when a simple and fixed limitation of six years applied mainly to various land 
transactions. Following a Law Committee report in 1936,6 the 1623 Act was 
reformed. This led to the Limitation Act 1939 enacting the recommendation that ‘a 
single limitation period should apply to actions in simple contract, and actions in tort.’7 
No special provisions existed in favour of claims for personal injury under the statute. 
However, the policy behind enacting the initial legislation was clear: ‘‘to create 
certainty and finality.’8 Generally this is in favour of a defendant, who ‘should not 
                                                 
4
 Ibid para.1.4. 
5
 Injuries arising as a result of negligence, nuisance or breach of duty.  
6
 Law Revision Committee, Fifth Interim Report (Statutes of Limitation) (1936) Cmnd 5334. 
7
 Law Commission, Consultation Paper on Limitation of Actions, (1998, Law Commission No 
LCCP151), para.1.6. 
8
 Jones, R.N., Burton, F., and Roy, A., Personal Injury Limitation Law, (2007, 2
nd
 edn., 
 Tottel Publishing) p.1. 
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have to live with the risk of legal action indefinitely.’9 In 1954 Parliament passed the 
Limitation Act 1954 which introduced a lesser-fixed period of three years for cases 
specifically involving personal injuries. The law was therefore still supporting the 
initial policy of certainty, by prescribing the period as both short and fixed. 
 
The Introduction of Discoverability and Discretion 
Having a fixed limitation period began to emerge as a severe injustice to personal 
injury claimants as highlighted in Cartledge v E Joplin & Sons Ltd,10 which paved the 
way for ‘the impetus for reform of the limitation rules concerning personal injury.’11 In 
Cartledge, the claimants had been negligently exposed to hazardous material when 
working for the defendant between the years of 1939-1950. They subsequently fell ill 
with a severe lung disease before 1950 but did not become aware of their diseases 
until a later date issuing their claim for damages in 1956. The House of Lords (HL) 
held the case to be statute barred as it fell outside the limitation period of six years 
under the 1954 Act.12 The limitation period was to run from the date of the accrual of 
the injury ‘irrespective of his (a claimant’s) knowledge of such loss or damage.’13 Lord 
Reid expressed his concern towards the harshness of the decision: 
 
It appears to me to be unreasonable and unjustifiable in principle that a cause 
of action should be held to accrue before it is possible to discover any injury 
and, therefore, before it is possible to raise any action.14 
 
As a result, Parliament enacted the Limitation Act 1963 which introduced what has 
become known as the concept of ‘discoverability.’ Claimants had one year from their 
‘date of knowledge,’ to bring a claim. It is this date of knowledge concept that is now 
contained within section 14 of the LA 1980.  
 
In 1975, Parliament passed the Limitation Act 1975 and further reformed limitation 
law. Potentially disregarding the need for certainty, Parliament pursued ‘the most 
radical recommendation from the Law Reform Committee.’15 The 1975 Act introduced 
a discretion that the court would be able to use in favour of claimants, to completely 
                                                 
9
 McGee, A., and Scanlan, G., ‘Judicial Attitudes to Limitation,’ (2005) Civil Justice Quarterly 
p.460. 
10
 [1963] AC 758. 
11
 Murphy, J., Street of Torts, (2007, 12
th
 edn., Oxford University Press), p.650 
12
 In Cartledge v E Joplin & Sons the Limitation Act 1939 applied, as the injury occurred 
before the 1954 Act came into force, which meant the relevant period was six years.   
13
 [1963] AC 758 at 759. 
14
 Ibid per Lord Reid at 772. 
15
 Jones et.al., Personal Injury Limitation Law, p.10. 
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disapply the three-year limitation period. It is this discretion, which is now contained 
within s.33 of the LA 1980. 
 
This article adopts the view that the introduction of sections 14 and 33 threaten the 
level of certainty available in the law and argues that the extension and discretionary 
tools that have been given to the judiciary must inevitably result in a ‘lack of 
consistency’16 that ‘subverts the very purpose of limitation laws.’17 It also suggests 
that the provisions neglect the certainty required by the law in order to provide justice 
for defendants. Analysis of relevant case law and judicial application of both sections 
support these arguments. Throughout this article, the ‘purpose’ of limitation law will 
be taken to be ‘certainty.’ 
 
2 Judicial Application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1980 
The provision of section 14, prima facie mitigates the discussed purpose of limitation 
law. It threatens to undermine the creation of certain and final periods in which a 
defendant should expect to be subject to a claim for personal injury. The overall 
purpose of section 14 is to further define the reference to ‘the date of knowledge’ 
under section 11 of the Act, which will determine the date on which the limitation 
period will begin to run against a claimant. Under section 11(4) the primary limitation 
period in claims for personal injury is three years from the date on which the injury 
was accrued, or the date of knowledge, if later. 
 
The Provisions of Section 14 
Section 14(1) defines a claimant’s date of knowledge as the date on which the 
claimant first knew; that their injury was significant, that the injury was attributable to 
the alleged act or omission, and the identity of the defendant or the person that 
created the cause of action. The meaning of ‘significant’ appears to be the most 
important of these provisions as it is further defined in section 14(2); an injury is 
‘significant’ when the claimant would have reasonably considered his injury serious 
enough to justify the institution of proceedings against the defendant for damages. 
Section 14(3) additionally provides a test to determine whether a claimant has 
‘constructive knowledge’ of his case. Under this section it is possible for a claimant to 
be deemed to have constructive knowledge of his action if he can reasonably be held 
to have done so from the facts observable and ascertainable to him, or by seeking 
                                                 
16
 Pattern, K., ‘Judicial Discretion to extend the limitation period – policy, principle and 
application,’ (2004) Journal of Personal Injury Law pp.306 
17
 Ibid. 
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medical or other appropriate advice. A defendant may argue that a claimant has an 
earlier date of constructive knowledge on the grounds that it would be reasonable to 
expect a claimant to issue proceedings from what facts were available to him, or that 
the claimant should have taken advice from what he knew of his injury.  
 
Determining the ‘date of knowledge’- a subjective or an objective test? 
Judicial application of both these provisions has been criticised in that ‘the courts 
have shown little consistency of approach or coherence in propounding principle, in 
determining the attribution of knowledge.’18 It has proven difficult to gain clarity on 
whether ‘the law lays down an objective test… or whether there is an element of 
subjectivity in attributing knowledge.’19 This is in relation to both section 14(2) and the 
test for ‘significant injury’, and section 14(3) and the test for ‘constructive knowledge.’  
Between 1969 and 1996 the judiciary undoubtedly favoured that the subjective 
elements of each particular claimant should be taken into account in relation to both 
the test for ‘significant injury’ and ‘constructive knowledge.’   
 
It was the nature of the test for when a claimant would be fixed by constructive 
knowledge that first came under scrutiny by the judiciary. In Newton v Camel Laird & 
Co20 the CA held that when the Court were to consider whether a claimant should be 
fixed by an earlier date of constructive knowledge, over his actual knowledge, they 
must take into account the subjective characteristics of the particular claimant.  
 
In Newton the claimant’s wife brought an action against her deceased husband’s 
employers for the asbestosis he contracted during his time working for them, which 
lead to his death in August 1965. It was held that the test for constructive knowledge 
depended on the reasonable man, in the particular claimant’s position. Widgery LJ in 
particular held that ‘it is necessary to look at all the circumstances of the particular 
individual concerned.’21  
 
The CA in McCafferty v Metropolitan Police District Receiver22 followed their earlier 
decisions in relation to constructive knowledge and held that the test for when a 
claimant knew his injury to be ‘significant’ was also partly subjective and partly 
objective. The claimant in McCafferty brought an action for damages for the tinnitus 
                                                 
18
 McGee and Scanlan, ‘Judicial attitudes to Limitation,’ p.461. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 [1969] 1 WLR. 
21
 Ibid per Widgery LJ at p.421. 
22
 [1977] 1 WLR 1073. 
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he acquired as a result of his negligent employee failing to provide him with adequate 
protection for his ears, which lead to the early termination of his employment.  
 
Lane LJ emphasised the subjective elements, which must be considered in deciding 
whether a claimant knew his injury to be significant.  
 
it is clear that the test is partly a subjective test, namely: ‘would this plaintiff 
have considered the injury sufficiently serious?’ and partly an objective test, 
namely: ‘would he have been reasonable if he did not regard it as sufficiently 
serious?23 
 
This partly subjective and partly objective test remained good law and was first 
confirmed in relation to the provisions of the LA 1980 by the CA in Nash v Eli Lilly & 
Co.24 Subjective characteristics were to be taken into account under both section 
14(2) and section 14(3). The claimants had taken prescription drugs supplied by the 
defendant and began to suffer various side effects. It was held that determining 
whether each claimant had knowledge of their case ‘was a matter which had to be 
considered with reference to the individual facts of each plaintiff's case.’25  
 
At this point, the judiciary seemed to be sacrificing the certainty of limitation law to 
ensure justice for claimants. The partly subjective nature of the section 14 tests 
would mean that the law was difficult to predict. The nature of the test meant that the 
purpose of limitation law was certainly not being met. However, the judiciary did 
appear to apply a consistent test but this changed significantly from 1996 onwards.  
 
In Forbes v Wandsworth Health Authority26 the CA took a drastic diversion from its 
own decision in Nash v Eli Lilly, in relation to the nature of the test for constructive 
knowledge under section 14(3).  The Court held that the test ‘should be construed as 
applying a strictly objective approach in attributing constructive knowledge to a 
claimant.’27 The importation of an objective test was welcomed, in the sense that it 
would create hopes for a more predictable test for the date of knowledge. However, 
the fact that at this point in time, limitation law was faced with the difficulty of having 
the same court, the CA, decide differently on the same issue would appear as 
evidence of the inconsistency of approach towards. It was clear that ‘Nash and 
                                                 
23
 Ibid per Lane LJ at 1081. 
24
 [1993] 1 WLR 782. 
25
 Ibid per Purchas LJ at 791. 
26
 [1996] 3 WLR. 
27
 McGee, A. and Scanlan, G., ‘Constructive knowledge within the Limitation Act,’ (2003) Civil 
Justice Quarterly p.255. 
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Forbes could not be reconciled, and that the law would have to chose between the 
two authorities.’28 While the CA began to favour an objective test under section 14(3) 
in relation to constructive knowledge, they still appeared to favour a subjective 
approach to the test for ‘significant’ injury under section 14(2). In KR v Bryn Alyn 
Community (Holdings) Ltd29 the Court held that the nature of the ‘significant’ test had 
‘to have a degree of subjectivity within it.’30  
 
The conflict between Forbes and Nash lasted for an unacceptable period of eight 
years. The CA had created two completely different principles in relation to the test 
under section 14(3). This inconsistency would undoubtedly have made the task for 
the lower courts to implement reasoned decisions a difficult one during this period. 
Finally in 2004 the HL settled the dispute. In Adams v Bracknell Forest,31 the HL 
provided a ‘welcome re-affirmation’32 of the law relating to knowledge and the test 
relating to constructive knowledge. In Adams the claimant had made a claim against 
the defendant local council for negligently failing to diagnose him with dyslexia as a 
child. He ‘alleged that this failure had caused him to suffer disabling psychological 
syndromes such as depression, panic and lack of self-esteem,’33 and submitted his 
claim for damages 14 years after he left school, in 2002. The key issue was to decide 
whether the personal characteristics of the claimant, such as the particular claimant’s 
reticence,34 should be taken into account. The judge at first instance held that his 
claim was not statute barred and the defendants appealed that decision. The case 
subsequently reached the HL where it was held that the claimant’s case was statute 
barred due to the objective standards of the constructive knowledge test. Therefore, 
the more recent approach of the CA in Forbes was confirmed that personal 
characteristics were not to be taken into account.  
 
This increase in certainty from Adams, due to the objective nature of the test, 
appears to have since expanded to also cover section 14(2) and the test for 
significant injury. In Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) and Another v Young35 the CA 
moved away from the existing application of a subjective element within an objective 
                                                 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 [2003] EWCA Civ 783. 
30
 Jones et.al., Personal Injury Limitation Law, p.45. 
31
 [2004] UKHL 29. 
32
 Moules, R., ‘Out of the shadows and into the spotlight: the importance of civil procedure’. 
(2005) Civil Justice Quarterly p.37. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 [2004] UKHL 29 per Lord Hoffmann at [49]. 
35
 [2007] QB 932. 
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test, and held the test to determine when an injury became significant as purely 
objective. This was held to be largely due to the HL’s decision in Adams.  
 
In Catholic Care the defendant nursing home appealed against a decision that the 
claimant’s action in negligence was not statute barred. The claimant had been 
sexually abused by employees of the defendant in the 1970s, and claimed that he did 
not realise that his post-traumatic stress disorder, which he acquired later in life, was 
a significant injury caused by the abuse until 2000 when the case was bought to the 
attention of the police and he met with a psychologist. When deciding on the 
preliminary issue of when the claimant knew his injury to be significant enough to 
enable him to have knowledge of his claim against the defendant, the CA referred to 
the recent Adams’ decision. Dyson LJ decided that ‘the presence of the word 
‘reasonably’ in both sections required similar construction,’36 and therefore the test 
was objective as ‘Parliament cannot have intended that a substantially objective test 
be applied in section 14(3), but a substantially subjective test in section 14(2).’37 
 
Dyson drastically altered the application of the test for significance by stating that 
‘intelligence, personal history and all the personal characteristics of the claimant…are 
to be disregarded’38 favouring a purely objective approach. The CA therefore held the 
claimant’s case to be statute barred by his date of knowledge and the three-year 
limitation period was up. In so deciding so, the CA directly contradicted its own 
decision in KR v Bryn Alyn, creating further uncertainty as to what the nature of the 
test stood to be generating more difficulty for the lower courts. 
 
The effect of A v Hoare [2008] 
The recent case of A v Hoare [2008]39 has provided HL authority on the CA’s 
decision to depart from the subjective nature of the test for ‘significant’ injury under 
section 14(2). The conflict between KR v Bryn Alyn and Catholic Care have now 
been reconciled. The decisions in Catholic Care and subsequently McCoubrey v 
MOD have now been confirmed and the HL found in ‘favour of a simple objective 
test.’40  
 
                                                 
36
 Jones et.al., Personal Injury Limitation Law, p.45. 
37
 [2007] QB 932 per Dyson LJ at [95]. 
38
 [2005] 1 AC 76 per Dyson LJ at [45]. 
39
 [2008] UKHL 6. 
40
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Therefore a claimant’s subjective characteristics will not be regarded when deciding 
whether they knew that their injury was significant enough to justify proceedings. The 
dictum of Lord Hoffmann summarises the HL’s decision that section 33 of the LA 
1980 ‘is the place to in which to consider it (the subjective elements of a claimant).’ 
The discussion on judicial application of section 14 has proven extremely beneficial 
to determining the degree of certainty and predictability in this element of limitation 
law. Most importantly, the tests under section 14(2) for significant injury and section 
14(3) for constructive knowledge, are both objective and a high degree of certainty 
has been re-established.   
 
Judicial Inconsistency 
Discussion on case law relating to section 14 demonstrates that the most significant 
criticism, which negates the certainty and the purpose of limitation law, appears to be 
the inconsistency arising from judicial decision making. This is evident in the varying 
decisions of the courts in applying both the test for significant injury and constructive 
knowledge. Nevertheless, it would seem that by creating more certainty and 
predictability by adopting an objective test the judiciary have restored the fair balance 
of interests between claimants and defendants. The tests are objective and therefore 
do not favour claimants. In fact, it would appear that because the test for the date of 
knowledge is now objective, it is now weighed in the favour of defendants. The LC’s 
view that the law does not recognise the justice that should be afforded to claimants 
sufficiently could in fact be justified. However, as recognised by the HL in both 
Adams and Hoare, the claimant will always have the discretion of the Court to fall 
back on if their claim is statute barred by section 14. This then leads onto an 
examination of section 33.  
 
3 Judicial Application of Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 
If a claimant fails to argue that the three-year limitation period should be extended 
under section 14, then he will most likely look to the discretion under section 33 
where the court may allow an action that is time barred to proceed if it appears 
equitable to do so. The courts’ exercise of this discretion is important to establishing 
whether the purpose of limitation law can be met. Section 33(1)a) states that the 
court must have regard to any prejudice, which may result towards the claimant if 
section 11 is applied. Section 33(1)b) states that the court must have regard to any 
prejudice that may result towards the defendant if the discretion is exercised.    
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When determining the prejudice which may result against either the claimant or the 
defendant under section 33(3) the court must pay regard to ‘all the circumstances of 
the case.’ In particular this includes; the length of and reasons for the delay in 
proceedings, the cogency of available evidence, the conduct of the defendant after 
the cause of action arose, any disability of the claimant after the date of accrual, the 
conduct of the defendant once he knew he had a claim and the steps taken by the 
claimant to obtain legal, medical or any other advice.41   
 
Can any certainty be achieved whilst discretion exists? 
This article suggests that the very fact that the section 33 discretion exists means 
that all possibility for certainty in the law is removed. While the application of section 
14 goes far in achieving a more certain system for limitation periods, because of the 
objective nature of the tests, section 33 then makes these long awaited attempts at 
clarity seem somewhat futile. Both academics and professionals have recognised 
how considerably ‘discretion removes that comfort of certainty.’42 This appears to be 
an accurate evaluation.  
 
Firstly, the terminology used in the statute lacks clarity and appears extremely broad. 
When exactly it is ‘equitable’ to exercise the discretion has been noted to cause 
problems. In Firman v Ellis43 Lord Denning defined the term ‘equitable’, in relation to 
the discretion, to mean ‘fair and just.’44 This failure to provide any precise definition of 
the term simply increases the uncertainty of the provision, Patten states it ‘merely 
replaces one inexact concept with another.’45 Further, under section 33(3) the court 
must pay regard to ‘all the circumstances of the case’. It would seem that in being 
able to consider all the circumstances in each individual case, the law might not be 
very predictable. It is a broad reference, and even though the provision goes on to 
define issues such as delay, conduct and disability, the section implies that there is 
no limit as to what circumstances may be taken into account.  
 
The courts themselves would appear to be a significant reason why the discretion 
may result in such unpredictability. Despite the recommendations of the LC in 2001 
                                                 
41
 See ss.33(3)(a) to 33(3)(f) respectively. 
42
 Patten, ‘Judicial discretion to extend the limitation period,’ p.306. 
43
 [1978] 3 WLR 1. 
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 Ibid per Lord Denning at [3.168]. 
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to only apply the discretion in what have become known as ‘hard cases,’46 the HL 
have upheld that the discretion under section 33 is unfettered. In Horton v Sadler, the 
HL agreed that they ‘had a wide general discretion that was not limited to occasional 
difficult cases.’47 Furthermore, the courts have repeatedly shown ‘a reluctance to 
offer guidelines’48 for the exercise of their discretion.  
 
Each provision of the statutory checklist will now be examined to demonstrate 
whether there is any degree of predictability that can be extracted from judicial 
application of section 33. 
 
Section 33(3)a) length of and reasons for delay 
The court must first consider the length of and the reason as to why there was a 
delay on the part of the claimant in bringing the action. It appears somewhat difficult 
to establish any specific length of delay where the courts will refuse to exercise the 
discretion. In Buck v English Electric Co Ltd the claimant had contracted a disease as 
a result of exposure to hazardous dust in his working conditions. The High Court held 
that with regards to the length of the delay ‘there was a rebuttable presumption that a 
delay of five to six years would prejudice the defendants.’49 However, in 2003 in KR v 
Bryn Alyn the CA expressly doubted the proposition of a rebuttable presumption. 
Auld LJ considered that ‘some form of tariff for cases such as these’ would not 
conform to the broad nature of the discretion, but did say that, as a general rule, ‘the 
longer the delay…the more likely it is that the balance of prejudice will swing against 
disapplication.’ 50  
 
Thus it appears almost impossible to establish any degree of predictability due to the 
courts’ approach to what will suffice as an acceptable reason for the delay; ‘the 
question is not whether the reasons are reasonable but whether they are genuine.’51 
The word ‘genuine’ implies that the test would include little in the way of objectivity.   
In deciding whether the reasons for the delay are genuine, the courts have inserted 
more unpredictability into an already uncertain discretion. In Coad v Cornwall and 
Isles of Scilly Health Authority, the test for what is a ‘genuine’ reason for the delay 
                                                 
46
  Law Commission, Report on Limitation of Actions, (2001, LC No 270):  ‘it should only be 
the most exceptional cases that the Court will be justified in allowing a claimant a more 
generous time period within which to bring a claim.’ 
47
 [2007] 1 AC 307 per Lord Bingham at [9]. 
48
 Patten, ‘Judicial discretion to extend the limitation period,’ p.312. 
49
 [1977] 1 WLR 806. 
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was held by the CA to be subjective. Ward LJ drew attention to the specific wording 
of the section that ‘on the part of the plaintiff’ in section 33(3)(a) ‘indicates that it is a 
subjective inquiry.’52 The potential effect of the subjective nature of the test for what 
is an acceptable reason for delay is that the discretion may be extremely 
unpredictable. It means that no matter how unreasonable a claimant’s reason is for 
delaying his proceedings, it will not act to prevent the exercise of the discretion. 
 
Section 33(3)b) The effect of the delay on the cogency of evidence 
Section 33(3)b) links directly to section 33(3)(a) as ‘the longer the delay, the greater 
the likely effect on the cogency of evidence.’53 Case law appears to demonstrate that 
the circumstances where evidence will become less cogent, and therefore mean that 
the court is less likely to exercise its discretion, are quite predictable. In Forbes v 
Wandsworth, the High Court refused to exercise the discretion based on the 
difficulties in obtaining the relevant medical notes and locating witnesses. 54 What 
may amount to ‘evidential prejudice’ is an element of the discretion which is fairly 
certain and predictable, achieving some clarity for parties and the lower courts to be 
able to ascertain when evidence should affect the exercise of the discretion. The CA 
in Hartley v Birmingham City Council held that ‘what is of paramount importance is 
the defendant’s ability to defend.’55 In this case, where the action was delayed by 
only one day, the Court denied that the length of the delay was significant enough to 
hinder the defendants’ ability to defend. From case law it seems that where the delay 
is longer, the more likely it is that a defendant may be subject to evidential prejudice. 
Consequently, judicial application of section 33(3)b) appears to achieve a satisfactory 
degree of certainty.  
 
Section 33(3)c) Conduct of the defendant after the cause of action arose 
What type of conduct by the defendant will be regarded as prejudicial towards the 
claimant is broad, and would appear to make the discretion in relation to this section 
difficult to predict. In Marston v British Railways Board the defence the defendants 
had provided against the claim was mistakenly wrong and this was found to be a 
significant factor in exercising the discretion56. A defendant’s conduct may be held to 
be prejudicial towards a claimant, even when he honestly believed what he was 
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 [1997] 1 WLR 189 per Ward LJ at 195. 
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 Jones, M.A., Limitation Periods in Personal Injury Actions, (1995, Blackstone Press 
Limited), p.134. 
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 [1997] QB 402 per Stuart Smith LJ at pp.416-417. 
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doing was proper and correct. In addition, in Thompson v Brown, Lord Diplock saw 
conduct under this section ‘as including the conduct of his solicitors and his 
insurers.’57 This in itself makes the potential prejudice against a defendant under this 
section wide. It may result in the discretion being exercised in favour of the claimant 
due to the conduct of the defendant solicitors or insurers, which the defendant 
himself may not even be aware  
 
Sections 33(3)e) and 33(3(f) Conduct of the claimant since they became aware 
of the cause of action 
Both sections concern the conduct of the claimant since the cause of action arose. 
The first concerns to what extent the claimant acted promptly and reasonably once 
he knew he had a claim. The second concerns whether the claimant took any steps 
to obtain medical or legal advice, and if he did, then the nature of that advice. Unlike 
when the courts must consider the conduct of the defendant under section 33(3)c), 
sections 33(3)e) and 33(3)f) only include the conduct of the claimant himself who ‘is 
not necessarily to be associated with the conduct of his advisors.’58 In Das v Ganju 
the court held that ‘the failings of a plaintiff's lawyers must [not] be visited on her, and 
there was no other way in which her conduct could be properly criticised’59 and 
subsequently exercised the discretion in her favour. This in itself would seem to 
make the balancing of potential prejudice between claimants and defendants unfair. 
A defendant may be held blameworthy for the actions of his advisors, where a 
claimant will not.  
 
In relation to the extent to which the claimant acted promptly and reasonably once he 
knew he had a claim, under section 33(3)e), the courts have consistently held that 
‘the test to be applied is an objective one’,60 as established  in Rule v Atlas Stone Co 
Ltd.61 In Dale v British Coal Corp the CA held that the test for whether a claimant’s 
conduct was to be regarded as prompt and reasonable ‘is an objective one, namely, 
what would a reasonable workman in the position of the plaintiff do?’ 62 This element 
of objectivity would seem to take one step in making the discretion clearer and 
simpler to predict.  
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In relation to section 33(3)f), the court must then consider if the claimant sought 
medical advice. In Jones v G.D Searle and Co Ltd it was held that when a claimant 
has sought advice, legal or medical, what the court will be concerned with is whether 
the advice in general was ‘favourable or unfavourable’ to his case.63 This appears to 
remain the case under the current law in relation to the section 33 discretion and 
does not seem to raise any issues in relation to certainty.  
 
Section 33(3)f) The duration of any disability of the claimant after the accrual of 
the injury 
This final element of the ‘statutory checklist’ is quite straightforward and does not 
appear to pose threats to any issues of certainty. Disability under this section ‘has 
been defined as infants or as persons suffering from mental disorder.’64 A person 
who is a minor65 or who is mentally disabled66 for some or all of the period between 
the date of accrual and the date proceedings were issued should have this taken into 
account and if it is proven to have hindered the claimants ability to claim it ‘is likely to 
receive a sympathetic hearing.’67 
 
This discussion has shown that it is possible, in some instances, to show some 
attempt to apply a consistent discretion. Most notably it seems that the longer the 
delay, the more likely it is that the court will not exercise the discretion. However, this 
certainty is then almost completely lost by the subjective nature of the test for which 
reasons for delay will suffice. The Court will consider the reason the particular 
claimant has for their delay in instituting proceedings, no matter how unreasonable. 
This means that the discretion, which is already in itself ambiguous, is made even 
more uncertain against potential defendants.  
 
A more generous approach to discretion since A v Hoare 
As discussed, the case of A v Hoare and primarily the judgment of Lord Hoffmann, 
has made the test for section 14(2) inherently objective. His reasons for disregarding 
subjective characteristics and circumstances were that it is a question dealt with 
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under section 33(3)a) and the reasons for the delay on the part of the plaintiff.68 
Subsequently it seems ‘more weight’69 will now be given to section 33 as opposed to 
section 14, which clearly ‘is not a recipe for consistency’.70 This, combined with the 
fact that both Lord Hoffmann and Baroness Hale were ‘fully in support of the more 
generous approach to the exercise of the discretion’71 means that section 33 is now 
more likely to be the main contributing factor to uncertainty as ‘section 33 will now be 
more easily applied to a claim.’72 The potential effect that this will have on certainty is 
far from positive. 
  
4 The Effect of the House of Lords decision in A v Hoare 
Claims for intentional trespass to the person now fall under the same provisions as 
section 11 of the LA 1980, as opposed to section 2 that provided a fixed limitation 
period of six years for tort actions. In order to fully understand the problems that this 
historical legal development has potentially overcome, it is beneficial to consider the 
HL case of Stubbings v Webb.73 The facts of Stubbings were as follows. The 
claimant brought an action for damages against her stepfather and stepbrother for 
the sexual abuse she had suffered as a child. By the time the claimant issued 
proceedings against the defendants, the six-year limitation period under section 2 of 
the LA 1980 had expired. The claimant argued, referring to Letang v Cooper,74 that 
her claim should be subject to the three-year limitation period that applied to personal 
injuries and was capable of extension under the LA 1980. The CA in Letang v 
Cooper held that the term ‘breach of duty’ referred to in section 11 meant that the 
section applied to all torts resulting in personal injury. This fell to be a preliminary 
issue to be decided in Stubbings.  
 
The HL found in favour of the defendants and held that ‘complaints of deliberate 
assault, including acts of indecent assault, were subject to a six-year limitation 
period.’75 The decision in Letang v Cooper was overruled and the claimant’s case 
against the defendants, who had subjected her to abuse as a child, was statute 
barred.  
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The absurdity of the Stubbings decision is clearly demonstrated in S v W76 in which, 
as a result of the inflexibility of Stubbings ‘a late claim in negligence was allowed 
against a mother for failing to prevent the claimant's abuse by the father, but not a 
claim in trespass for battery against the father himself.’77 Evidently the limitation laws 
that applied to cases of intentional trespass were ‘capable of causing considerable 
injustice.’78  
 
The decision in A v Hoare 
The HL ruling in Hoare followed considerable recommendations that the decision in 
Stubbings should be overruled, as it was ‘illogical and unjust.’79 Hoare concerned five 
joined appeals from victims of intentional abuse or assault, the most significant of 
these concerned the widely publicised ‘lottery rapist,’ Iorworth Hoare, the facts of 
which are unusual. The claimant had been the victim of an attempted rape by the 
defendant in 1988. Following criminal proceedings the defendant was convicted of 
attempted rape and received a sentence of life imprisonment. On the day of his 
release from prison, he won several million pounds on the National Lottery. The 
claimant, on discovering this brought a civil action for damages against the defendant 
for the psychological injuries she had suffered as a result of his earlier crimes. Her 
claim was statute barred as the provision that applied to her injury was section 2 of 
the LA 1980, and thus the fixed six-year time period was up. The issue reached the 
HL on whether claims for intentional trespass to the person could fall within section 
11. 
 
It fell to be decided ‘which of the two regimes of limitation governed the actions.’80 
The HL drew attention to the history of the LA 1980, which implied that ‘‘breach of 
duty’ in section 2(1) of the 1954 Act included trespass to the person.’81 In particular 
Lord Hoffman took note of the LA 1975, which introduced the discretion in the first 
place, which indicated that there was ‘no good reason to exclude such victims (of 
intentional trespass to the person) from it.’82 The HL decided, with all five judges in 
agreement, that because of this, what was held in Letang v Cooper was in fact the 
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correct approach to the section. Their Lordships reasoning to depart from Stubbings 
and apply the Practice Statement varied but to keep the decision in Stubbings would 
‘impede the coherent development of the law.’83 From this, and from accepting 
modern developments to demonstrate how ‘victims may be too traumatised to bring 
(a claim) within the limitation period,’84 the HL departed from Stubbings. The decision 
has therefore now been overruled and section 11 now includes claims for intentional 
trespass to the person resulting in personal injury.  
 
The effect of the decision on certainty  
Discussion suggests that, since the decision in Hoare, section 14 will now be more 
certain. The fact that intentional trespass is now governed by the same limitation 
regime as all personal injury ‘is to be welcomed’85 in the sense that it creates 
‘rationality and uniformity’86 in limitation. It has also brought the law in line with the 
recommendations of the LC,87 and in this respect would appear to be a positive step 
forward. However, the effect of this decision is that the uncertainty in application is 
potentially going to increase. Both sections 14 and 33 now apply to claims of 
intentional trespass to the person. Therefore, the instances where the proposed 
uncertainty of discretion applies, now applies to even more types of injury.  
 
It has been said that the decision ‘could pave the way for thousands of actions by 
victims of sex abuse to make claims against their attackers many years after they 
were attacked’88 extending the scope of potential uncertainty, but Hoare is based on 
‘exceptional circumstances’89 and the ‘fears of floodgates opening are 
misconceived.’90 A brief analysis of post-Hoare will now be conducted to help clarify 
how the new Hoare principles appear to be affecting limitation law. 
 
5 Post A v Hoare 
It has been just over one year since the HL delivered its judgment in Hoare. The 
most recent case to follow the decision comes from the High Court in Raggett v 
Society of Jesus Trust.91 The claimant alleged that his now deceased male teacher, 
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Father Spencer, sexually abused him during his years as a pupil at a Catholic school 
between 1969 and 1976. Following initial disputes over who the correct defendant 
was, a claim was issued against the Board of Governors (the defendant) on 14 
March 2008, over 30 years from the time that the alleged abuse took place. The 
claimant took an action based on vicarious liability against the defendant school and 
sought to recover damages for personal injury, claiming that his failed career, 
alcoholism and psychological distress were a result of physical and psychological 
abuse by Father Spencer. The evidence provided in favour of the claimant’s 
allegations was strong. It included correspondence from Father Spencer years after 
the abuse, making reference to specific instances during the period of abuse. There 
were also numerous witness accounts from the claimant’s school acquaintances that 
had come forward voluntarily. In response, the defendant’s raised the limitation 
defence. It therefore fell to be determined as a preliminary issue, whether the 
claimant’s case was out of time under section 11 of the LA 1980. The judgment given 
by the Honourable Mrs Justice Swift provides some excellent reflection on the 
application of the decision in A v Hoare.  
 
Application of Section 14 
Although mentally aware that the activities were taking place at the time, the claimant 
alleged that he did not ‘know’ for the purpose of limitation that he had actually been 
subjected to unlawful acts until a conversation with a friend in 2005. Upholding the 
rules established in Hoare, Justice Swift reiterated the objective nature of the tests 
for knowledge under section 14.92 She referred to the ‘practical and relatively 
unsophisticated approach to the question of knowledge’ devised by Lord Hoffman in 
Hoare. It was confirmed that the claimant must have been taken to have objectively 
‘known’ that he had suffered a significant injury at the time the abuse occurred.  
Justice Swift held that the three-year limitation period began to run from the date of 
the claimant’s majority, being his eighteenth birthday, and that his claim was statute 
barred since June 1979.   
 
This strict approach to section 14 confirms the increased certainty available in the 
application of the LA 1980. The instances where claimants will be taken to bring their 
claim within the three-year limitation period because of delayed knowledge appears 
to be limited by the continued application of an objective test increasing the level of 
certainty in the law.  
                                                 
92
 [2009] EWHC 909 (QB) paras.108-109 
Plymouth Law Review (2009) 1 
44 
 
 
Application of Section 33 
After ruling out the possibility that the claimant had brought his claim within three 
years from his date of knowledge, the Court considered whether or not to exercise 
the discretion to allow the claim to proceed under section 33. Justice Swift 
considered the usual statutory checklist and exercised a balancing of prejudice test 
towards both the claimant and the defendant. The most significant sections posed for 
consideration were sections 33(3)a) and 33(3)b), the length of and reason for the 
delay, and the effect of the delay on the cogency of evidence. While accepting that 
the length of the delay was overly long, Justice Swift acknowledged that the reasons 
given for the delay were acceptable in relation to this particular claimant.93 She 
continued to consider the effect of such a delay on the cogency of evidence and 
whether the defendants would have been in a significantly better position to disprove 
the allegations if they were brought within a reasonable period of time.94 Justice Swift 
concluded that based on the evidence available, such as the witnesses who had 
come forward voluntarily, the defendants were always going to have a difficult task in 
disproving the allegations95 Furthermore, she found it difficult to believe that even if 
Father Spencer were alive and denied the allegations, it would have been possible 
for such a plea to override the existing evidence.96   
 
Vicarious Liability 
As the employer of Father Spencer, the school was vicariously liable for any tortuous 
acts that he committed. It was held in Lister v Helsey Hall that for vicarious liability to 
arise there must be a ‘sufficiently close connection’ between the course of the 
employment of the tortfeasor and the torts committed,97 and that torts of sexual 
abuse are capable of falling within the course of employment. In considering whether 
or not to exercise the discretion under section 33, Justice Swift highlighted how the 
existence of a vicarious relationship between the defendant and Father Spencer had 
a simplistic effect on deciding the case. As vicarious liability is strict, if it could be 
shown that the acts had taken place, then the school would be liable. Justice Swift 
compared this to cases based on negligence that would be less straightforward,98 as 
evidence would need to be strong enough to prove the requisite duty, standard and 
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breach on the part of the school in failing to prevent the abuse. Justice Swift 
accepted that in these cases, the required evidence would be difficult to prove 30 
years on.   
 
For example, in Albonetti v Wirral Metropolitan Borough Council,99 the difficulty in 
proving negligence 40 years later was the reason that the section 33 discretion could 
not be exercised. The claimant took an action against a children’s home for 
negligently failing to prevent abuse by a friend of the home. In the absence of a 
vicarious relationship the court regarded it as impossible for a fair trial to be achieved 
after such a long delay and refused to exercise the section 33 discretion.100 But 
Justice Swift asserted that the ability of the defendants to defend the issue of liability 
had not materially been affected and a fair trial on the issue of causation was still 
possible. The Court exercised the discretion, the three-year limitation period did not 
apply and the claimant was not barred from pursuing his claim for damages against 
the school.  
 
The effect of the decision in Raggett on certainty  
That the High Court exercised the discretion in Raggett, where there was a delay of 
over 30 years, suggests that the more ‘generous approach’ established in Hoare, is 
being applied by the judiciary. It is under section 33 that the judiciary will consider the 
subjective characteristics of a defendant. This poses a threat to the certainty of the 
law but it can be argued that this may not be as great as initially thought. Raggett 
indicates that section 33 is only practically going to be available to a specific group of 
claimants, who have a claim in vicarious liability. It has been argued that it is 
vicarious liability that will prove to be the ‘mechanism for resolving cases where 
compensation is sought for past abuse.’101 The success of the claimant in Raggett 
was due to the combination of intentional trespass now considered under the same 
limitation provisions as personal injury, and the ability to then take an action for this 
tort on the basis of vicarious liability. It must be questioned whether or not he would 
have succeeded if there was no vicarious relationship in which case he would have 
had to take his claim in negligence, just as in Albonetti, where the judiciary did not 
exercise the discretion.  
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It is not uncommon in abuse cases where there is often a long delay in bringing the 
action that the person who committed the tort is not capable of being sued. In 
Raggett this was because the tortfeasor was deceased. However, it can often be due 
to other reasons, such as the fact that the tortfeasor is impecunious. In such cases, if 
there is no vicarious relationship for the claimant to base his claim on, then a claim in 
negligence against a party for failing to prevent the abuse will be the claimant’s only 
option. Raggett indicates that because of the evidential difficulties that will face 
historical abuse claims based on negligence, it is unlikely that the claimant will 
convince a court to disapply the limitation period, and it is argued that ‘few cases 
(based on negligence) will convince a court that section 33 ought to be employed.’102  
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
The judiciary appear to have made some attempts over the years, to increase the 
level of certainty in the law relating to limitation periods. A strict objective test to 
determining the date of knowledge under section 14 of the LA 1980 is now 
consistently being applied. Here claimants will find it difficult to show that their claim 
has been made within the three-year period, due to delayed knowledge. This will 
make the application of section 14 more certain. 
 
However, as the judiciary are adopting a more generous approach to the discretion 
under section 33, this will mean that uncertainty in the law is potentially going to 
increase as the subjective elements of a claimant can be considered. It now seems 
that ‘more weight’ will be placed on section 33 and that the discretion will be 
exercised in a greater number of cases, including claims for intentional trespass to 
the person since the decision in A v Hoare. These developments have led to fear of 
the floodgates opening, and that there will be greater uncertainty in limitation law. In 
reality it seems that fears of Hoare opening the floodgates should not be so extreme. 
Raggett has provided some current guidance on where the decision in Hoare may 
take us. It seems that vicarious liability will play an important role on the availability of 
the section 33 discretion and that the future for certainty in limitation law following 
Hoare, may not be as hopeless as initially suggested. This is not to say that there will 
be a high level of certainty, it simply means that certainty may not be as threatened 
as it could have been.   
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This article has established that the current purpose of certainty in limitation law does 
not seem to be being met and several recommendations could be considered in an 
attempt to overcome this problem. First of all, it has been suggested that ‘limitation 
periods in claims for personal injury should be abolished.’103 This suggestion, 
although extreme, should not be disregarded as an alternative. In light of the 
comment ‘that certainty will gain no merit if all it results in is injustice,’104 the 
suggestion to make all claims depend on the equitable discretion would seem 
understandable. Alternatively, it has also been suggested that ‘the reporting of such 
cases merely causes confusion and difficulty in reconciliation’105 and that therefore, 
an alternative would be to simply not publish decisions in relation to section 33. This 
recommendation would at least avoid the difficulty that judicial confusion and 
inconsistency causes the lower courts.  
 
The responsibility of clarifying the law of limitation periods would, for the time being 
however, appear to rest with Parliament.  A fresh look at ‘making the law simpler and 
more consistent’106 will take place some time later this year in the Civil Law Reform 
Bill 2009. It would therefore be beneficial to reflect on this discussion once this long 
awaited response from Parliament is finally received, alongside additional case law 
following the decisions in Hoare and Raggett. 
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